This paper analyzes productive government expenditure in a stochastic AK growth model. First a centrally planned economy is characterized, emphasizing the tradeoff between the effects of both deterministic and stochastic government expenditures on the equilibrium growth rate and its variance. Both the growth-maximizing and the welfaremaximizing shares of government expenditure are derived, and shown to depend (differentially) upon the degree of risk in the economy. Next the stochastic equilibrium in a decentralized economy is derived. The first-best optimal tax structure is characterized and its dependence on risk determined. The formal analysis has been supplemented by a set of numerical simulations, assessing the quantitative significance of risk.
1.

Introduction
The recent literature on endogenous growth models has emphasized the role of public expenditure as an important determinant of long-run national growth rates and growth rate differentials. Beginning with Barro (1990) , a number of authors have introduced government expenditure as an argument in the production function, to reflect its impact on the productive capacity of the economy. 1 This has led to a number of important propositions relating the growth rate to the size of government, and to the characterization of optimal expenditure policy. However, these models are purely deterministic and therefore abstract from all considerations of risk.
Being a long-term process, growth is inherently subject to risks, as unforeseen technological shocks and other stochastic disturbances occur over time. The importance of risk as an influence on the growth rate is widely recognized, and there is a growing empirical literature investigating the relationship between volatility and growth, a relationship that at least theoretically can be either positive or negative. Early papers by Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Grier and Tullock (1989) obtain positive relationships between the mean growth rate of output and its standard deviation. Recently, Ramey and Ramey (1995) obtain a negative relationship, arguing that the difference is due to whether one is focusing on the volatility of predicted variables or their innovations.
The present paper extends the Barro model of productive government expenditure by analyzing its role in a growing economy subject to stochastic productivity shocks. Previous studies have introduced risk into endogenous growth models, although in these models the government expenditure serves no productive purpose and is only a pure drain on the economy's resources; see e.g. Eaton (1981) and Grinols and Turnovsky (1993) . One crucial issue in introducing a government-provided input concerns its public-good characteristics. A natural starting point adopted by several authors is to treat it as a non-rival pure public good, but this treatment fails to take account of the congestion that several authors have argued is typically associated with public goods. Accordingly, there is a growing literature associating various forms of congestion with public goods in endogenous growth models; see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) , Ravikumar (1994, 1997) , Turnovsky (1996 Turnovsky ( , 1997 . We will parameterize the degree of congestion, thereby enabling us to incorporate a range of public goods, extending from pure non-rival to pure rival but non-excludable, public goods, the latter sharing many of the characteristics of private goods.
We begin by considering the benchmark case of a centrally planned economy in which the government controls all quantities directly. The key parameter determining the tradeoff between the equilibrium growth rate of capital and its variance is the degree of risk aversion, the tradeoff being positive if this exceeds unity and negative otherwise. This relationship is characteristic of linear stochastic growth models; see Grinols and Turnovsky (1993) , Devereux and Smith (1994), Obstfeld (1994) . Our main focus is on the sensitivity of this tradeoff to both deterministic and stochastic government expenditures. Whereas an increase in the deterministic share of output devoted to productive government expenditure exacerbates the stochastic shocks and is therefore destabilizing, an increase in the stochastic output share absorbed by the government is stabilizing. Optimal government expenditure policies are discussed. We show how the presence of risk dramatically changes some of the propositions familiar from the Barro model. For example, both the welfare-maximizing and growth-maximizing (deterministic) rates of government expenditure are affected differentially by the presence of risk. Accordingly, the coincidence of these two optimal quantities in the simple deterministic AK growth model does not generalize to the corresponding stochastic economy. 2 This is because welfare-maximization involves trading off risk and return from accumulating capital, and maximizing the (mean) growth rate leads to a level of government expenditure that entails too much risk for a risk averse agent. Furthermore, whereas welfare-maximization requires the government to absorb all the risk, this is consistent with growth maximization only if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is less than unity.
The degree of congestion is important in distinguishing the decentralized equilibrium from that of the centrally planned economy. It introduces an externality and in discussing the decentralized economy, most of our attention is devoted to characterizing the appropriate optimal tax structure. The conditions under which the decentralized economy is able to replicate the first-best outcome of the central planner are determined. We show that the general form of the optimal tax structure previously shown to achieve this in the absence of risk extends with only mild adjustments to this stochastic economy. The important new feature is that the sensitivity of the optimal tax structure to risk depends upon the degree of congestion.
While most of our discussion is analytical, we supplement our formal analysis with some numerical calculations. These offer insights into the plausible magnitudes for the various responses.
We calibrate a simple model, making use of some estimates of means and standard deviations of growth rates provided by Ramey and Ramey (1995) for a set of 92 countries. The data illustrate a wide range of standard deviations of growth rates experienced by different economies. OECD countries on average have experienced only mild risk (standard deviation of growth rates of around 2.5%) and the effect of risk on the equilibrium are correspondingly modest, though not trivial. For example, the welfare losses from risk in OECD economies are found to be of the order of 1.5-2% of the capital stock. For the mean degree of risk of all countries in the sample (standard deviation of growth rates of around 5%) the effects of risk on the equilibrium are substantially larger (around 5-8%), and they become quite dramatic, in the case of the high risk economies of the world.
Furthermore, the divergence between the growth-maximizing size and the welfare-maximizing size of government increases substantially with risk.
A Stochastically Growing Economy
The model is specified using continuous time. This has the advantage that the closed form solutions we obtain are transparent, and highlight the tradeoffs between risk and return. We consider an economy populated by N identical representative agents who consume and produce a single good.
The flow of output, dy, produced by the typical individual over the period ( t,t + dt ), is determined by his privately owned capital stock, k, and the rate of flow of services, H s , derived from his use of a public good, in accordance with the stochastic production function: 3
where du is a proportional productivity shock common to all agents, that is independently and normally distributed over time, having zero mean and variance σ u 2 dt . Equation (1) asserts that the individual's mean rate of output flow, z, is subject to positive, but diminishing, marginal physical product, in both the level of services of public expenditure, H s , and his individual capital stock, k, and constant returns to scale in these two factors of production, together. The model abstracts from labor so that private capital should be interpreted broadly to include human as well as physical capital; see Rebelo (1991) . The assumption that the productivity shock is proportional to the current mean level of output, z, is important and plausible. 4 It implies that an increase in the deterministic flow of government services, H s , amplifies the magnitude of the stochastic productivity shock, du.
The productive services derived by the agent from the deterministic expenditure on the public good are represented by
where H denotes the aggregate deterministic rate of flow of public expenditure and K ≡ Nk denotes the aggregate stock of private capital. In introducing productive government expenditure one must choose between formulating it as flow or as a stock, a choice that involves a tradeoff between tractability and realism. Most specifications introduce it as a flow, leading to an equilibrium in which the economy is always on its balanced growth path. But to the extent that such expenditures are intended to represent public infrastructure, it is arguably the accumulated stock that is the relevant measure. This formulation generates an equilibrium characterized by transitional dynamics. Analytical tractability of the stochastic model leads us to adopt the flow specification, so that the model is therefore a direct stochastic analog to Barro (1990) .
Equation (2) characterizes what one may call relative congestion, in that the productive services derived by an agent from a given rate of public expenditure depends upon the usage of his individual capital stock relative to aggregate usage. This is a plausible assumption, a good example of which is the use of highway services. Unless an individual drives his car he derives no benefits from a publicly provided highway, and in general the level of services he does enjoy is adversely affected by the total usage of cars by others insofar as this causes congested roads. The fact that the benefits from the public good are tied to the individual's use of his capital encourages private investment and is important in the determination of the optimal tax rate. 5
The exponent δ parameterizes the relative congestion associated with the public good. The case δ = 1 corresponds to a non-rival, non-excludable public good that is available equally to each agent, independent of the size of the economy; there is no congestion. There are few, if any, examples of such pure public goods, so that this case should be treated largely as a benchmark. Alternatively, if δ = 0 , then only if H increases in direct proportion to the aggregate capital stock, K , does the level of the public service available to the individual firm remain fixed, given his individual stock. We shall refer to this case as being one of proportional relative congestion, meaning that the congestion grows in direct proportion to the size of the economy. In this case the public good is rival, but not excludable.
It is like a private good in that in equilibrium the typical agent receives his proportionate share of the good. In between, 0 < δ < 1, describes less congestion, where H can increase at a slower rate than does K and still maintain a fixed level of public services to the firm. 6 5 A natural alternative specification of congestion is to assume that it is of the absolute form H s = HK δ −1 . However, this formulation is consistent with an equilibrium of ongoing endogenous growth only under restrictive conditions.
6 The case δ < 0 describes an extreme situation in which the congestion is such that the public good must grow faster than the economy in order to maintain the level of services. Although we do not discuss it, substantial empirical evidence supports this case; see Edwards (1990) .
Substituting (2) into (1), the individual firm's production function can be expressed as
As long as δ ≠ 1, so that the public good is associated with some congestion, aggregate capital is introduced into the production function of the individual firm in an analogous way to Romer (1986) . 7 The flow of resources claimed by the government over the period (t,t + dt ) is specified by:
where H denotes the deterministic (expected) rate of expenditure over the period dt and ′ H denotes the current stochastic expenditure flow, as a proportion of the stochastic output shock. 8 We shall let Z = Nz denote the aggregate mean rate of output flow and assume that the government sets H, and ′ H as fractions of the current deterministic and stochastic rates of flow of aggregate output:
Thus the fraction, h, represents the policy maker's choice of the (deterministic) size of government, while ′ h (0 ≤ ′ h ≤ 1) represents the fraction of the aggregate output shock, Zdu , absorbed by the government. If h is constant, the government is claiming a fixed share of the growing (mean) output, so that an increase in h parameterizes a deterministic expansion in expenditure in a growing economy.
The production function (1) assumes that only the deterministic component of government expenditure is productive. This is a plausible benchmark case, since one may argue that the productive application of resources by the government takes time. Information on the stochastic component of 7 If δ = 0 , so that we have proportional relative congestion, then the production function (1') implies constant returns to scale in k. 8 The assumption of proportional disturbances implies that the standard deviation of output shocks is more or less stationary, an assumption consistent with the data.
output, du, during the period (t,t + dt ) arrives at the end of the instant, and the government's share of that output is known too late to be used productively during that same instant of time. Instead, it may be assumed to be devoted to some consumption good that does not interact directly with private consumption in yielding utility to the representative agent. 9
Combining (4a) and (1') the rate of output of the individual firm can be expressed as:
With all agents being identical and the stochastic shock du being identical for all N agents, in equilibrium, individual output and aggregate output, dY = Ndy , may be expressed as
Henceforth, for notational convenience we shall let
denote the equilibrium average productivity of capital, both at the aggregate and at the individual level.
Observe that the equilibrium individual and aggregate production functions are both of the "AK form", where the productivity of capital increases with the deterministic share of output devoted to productive government, and decreases with the degree of congestion. Observe also, that as long as δ ≠ 0 , the productivity of capital depends upon the population; the economy is characterized by "scale effects". 10 9 It is possible to modify the production function so that the stochastic component of government expenditure is also (instantaneously) productive. Our main results are robust with respect to simple extensions in this direction, which thus turn out primarily to complicate the analysis.
The intuition for this result is simply that the individual productivity depends upon aggregate government spending, H = hN , so that more agents in the economy imply a bigger externality, unless completely offset by congestion. The critical difference between the perception of the world as seen by the representative agent and as seen by the central planner in their respective decision making is as follows. The individual treats the aggregate capital stock, K, as given and views the production function as specified in (5). The central planner, on the other hand, internalizes the relationship K = Nk when determining his decisions; he therefore operates in accordance with (6') or (6).
Using this notation, the flow of resources claimed by the government over the period (t,t + dt ), (3) may be written as:
But there need be no presumption that the government will have the flexibility to spend in the short run. In the absence of any flexibility, ′ h = 0 , and government expenditure is nonstochastic at each instant of time, as we shall assume for private consumption to be; see Corsetti (1997) . 11 To implement the expenditure rule (7) the government must be able to distinguish between the deterministic and stochastic movement of output If, on the other hand, the government observes only aggregate movements in output, dY, then ′ h ≡ h and the expenditure rule is constrained to be:
The individual agent consumes this good at the (nonstochastic) rate dc = c(t)dt , so that aggregate consumption evolves according to: dC = C(t)dt . All activities are subject to the aggregate resource constraint:
which upon substitution, becomes
The Centrally Planned Economy
The representative agent's welfare is represented by the intertemporal isoelastic utility function:
where the exponent γ is related to the coefficient of relative risk aversion s, by s = 1− γ , with γ = 0 being equivalent to a logarithmic utility function. The empirical evidence suggests a relatively high degree of risk aversion, in which case γ < 0. 12 In this section we analyze the case where the government acts as a central planner and chooses consumption, the rate of capital accumulation, and government expenditure to maximize the intertemporal utility function (10), subject to the stochastic capital accumulation condition (9). We assume initially that the planner sets the expenditure parameters, h, ′ h arbitrarily, and then consider the case where they are set optimally.
The optimization is straightforward and leads to the following stochastic macroeconomic equilibrium (see e.g. Turnovsky (1995, Chapter 14) for a detailed discussion of this class of problem):
with the corresponding stochastic equilibrium growth rate being:
12 See e.g. the discussion in Obstfeld (1994) and the recent empirical evidence by Campbell (1996) .
where:
so that the variance of the growth path, σ k 2 , is therefore: 13
It is important to recognize that this form of the central planner's problem is identical to the analysis of fiscal policy as formulated by Barro (1990) . The deterministic expenditure share, h, in the present analysis is identical to the income tax rate in that case.
Growth and Volatility
Equations (12) and (13) provide a natural framework for analyzing the potential tradeoff between the growth rate and its volatility studied by Ramey and Ramey (1995) and others. In particular, equation (13a) implies that higher risk will be associated with lower growth of capital if and only if γ > 0, that is if and only if the coefficient of risk aversion is less than unity. The intuition for this result derives from the fact that an increase in risk, dσ k 2 , has a negative income effect − dσ k 2 and a positive substitution effect dσ k 2 (1− γ ) on consumption, the net effect of which equals Sandmo (1970) . Thus if γ > 0 a higher variance causes the equilibrium C K 13 In addition, the transversality condition must hold. For the constant elasticity utility function this requires that
Solving the stochastic differential equation (12), this reduces to the condition C K > 0 . This is automatically met for the logarithmic function, but imposes restrictions on the size of government, otherwise. A similar condition applies in the decentralized economy.
ratio to rise, and the rate of capital accumulation and growth to fall correspondingly. But given the empirical evidence favoring a large coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ < 0) , the model more realistically predicts a positive association between instability and growth, and thus is consistent with the earlier empirical work of Kormendi and Meguire (1985) , as well as the analytical argument of Black (1987) . 14 At the same time we should recall that these authors were concerned with output growth, for which the growth of capital may serve as a poor proxy. 15
The growth-volatility tradeoff is affected by structural changes in the economy. For example, a higher variance in the supply shock, σ u 2 , raises the variance of the growth rate, thus raising the mean growth rate, ψ , if γ < 0 and lowering it otherwise. Furthermore, more congestion, as reflected by a reduction in δ lowers the productivity of capital. In the absence of risk this reduces the growth rate unambiguously. But by reducing the productivity of capital it also reduces the variance associated with the productivity shocks and thereby provides a stabilizing effect. If γ < 0 this stimulates consumption, thereby reducing the growth rate further; if γ > 0 it reduces consumption, thus rendering the net effect on the growth rate ambiguous.
But the tradeoff may also reflect government policy and an important issue to be addressed concerns the size and variability of government policy, and its impact on growth performance. For this purpose, h ≡ H Z serves as a natural parameterization of the mean size of the government sector, while ′ h measures the intensity of stochastic intervention. From (7) we can immediately derive: 14 The role of the coefficient of relative risk aversion as being the crucial determinant of the risk-growth tradeoff is characteristic of the stochastic AK growth model; see e.g. Devereux and Smith, (1994) , Obstfeld (1994) , and Benavie, Grinols, and Turnovsky (1996) . The constant elasticity utility function imposes the restriction that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Obstfeld employs a more general utility function that separates these two coefficients. In that case the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is the critical parameter in determining the risk-growth tradeoff. 15 The model can be shown to imply that the equilibrium mean growth of output equals that of capital.
This measures the variance of government expenditure. With the policy parameters, h, ′ h being deterministic, this policy variance is induced by the productivity shocks. It is therefore not identical to Aizenman and Marion (1993) who consider the variability of government policy itself, though as a practical empirical matter it may be difficult to distinguish between a measure of σ g 2 that is generated from structural shocks, from one generated by stochastic policy choices.
Deterministic Government Expenditure
We now consider how the size of the deterministic share of output claimed by the government, h, affects the stability of the economy and its tradeoff with the growth rate. From (13c, 13d), we see that an increase in h raises both the variance of the growth rate and the variance of policy:
An increase in h raises the productivity of capital, and because of the proportional productivity shocks this exacerbates their variance. A larger fraction of the mean output flow devoted to productive government thus destabilizes the growth rate, the destabilizing effect being larger the more important government is in the production function. Similarly, a larger productive government increases the variance of government expenditure.
The effect of the larger h on the mean growth rate is then given by:
In the absence of risk, this depends upon β − h , the productivity elasticity of government expenditure less its resource costs, as in the Barro (1990) model. But in addition, by raising the variance, this induces an income effect and a substitution effect in consumption, the net impact of which has just been noted depends upon sgn(γ ). Thus if the higher risk leads to a reduction in consumption this raises the mean growth rate, and conversely.
Setting (14b) to zero, we find that the (expected) growth-maximizing share of productive government expenditure, ˜ h , is defined implicitly by: 16
In the absence of risk, the growth rate is maximized by setting the share of output devoted to productive government expenditure equal to the elasticity of government expenditure in the production function, β . But the presence of risk increases this share if γ < 0, and decreases it otherwise. This is because increasing h accentuates production risk and this will reduce consumption and raise the growth rate if γ < 0. Observe also that the growth-maximizing deterministic share of government expenditure, ˜ h , depends upon the (arbitrary) stochastic expenditure share, ′ h , as well as upon δ .
Stochastic Government Expenditure
An increase in the stochastic component of output absorbed by the government, ′ h , reduces the variance of the growth rate, σ k 2 , but increases the variance of policy:
implying a direct tradeoff between the amount of risk borne by the government and that borne by the private sector. If ′ h = 1, the variance of the growth rate is eliminated entirely, all risk being borne by the government; if ′ h = 0 all risk is absorbed by the private sector.
The effect of a higher stochastic share of government expenditure on the mean growth rate is given by the expression:
Thus we see that if γ > 0, setting ′ h = 1 and minimizing the variance of the growth rate will maximize the expected growth rate. By contrast, if γ < 0, setting ′ h = 0 and not intervening stochastically, thus maximizing the variance borne by the private sector, will maximize the expected growth rate.
Combining with (16a) and (15) we see that the (expected) growth-maximizing deterministic and stochastic government expenditure shares, ˜ h ,˜ ′ h can be characterized as follows:
The extent to which maximizing the expected growth rate requires the elimination of risk depends upon the degree of risk aversion. What is required is to choose the degree of stochastic intervention, ′ h , to minimize the consumption-capital ratio given the existing risk, [see (11)], thereby maximizing the amount of output available for investment. With a low degree of risk aversion (γ > 0) this is accomplished by setting ′ h = 1 and completely eliminating risk. This allows the government to set a larger deterministic scale than otherwise, and indeed to set the same scale as in the absence of risk.
With a high degree of risk aversion (γ < 0) the consumption-capital ratio is minimized by setting ′ h = 0 and letting the private sector absorb all the risk. In this case consumption is reduced drastically, thus permitting the government to set its deterministic scale larger than it would in the absence of risk.
Equations (13c) and (13d) provide insight into the empirical findings of Aizenman and Marion (1993) that policy variability is growth reducing. Consider an increase in the rate of stochastic intervention, ′ h . This will raise σ g 2 , while reducing σ k 2 ; that is the variance of policy will increase, while the variance of the growth rate will decline. This in turn will raise consumption and reduce the growth rate in the empirically more plausible case where γ < 0. Thus under these conditions a greater variance in policy, induced by more intensive stochastic intervention, ′ h , will reduce the growth rate of capital, thus supporting the empirical evidence provided by Aizenman and Marion.
Welfare-Maximizing Government Expenditure
Optimizing with respect to h, we can show that the welfare-maximizing deterministic fraction of output devoted to productive government expenditure is defined implicitly by: 17
In the absence of risk, ˆ h = β , as shown by Barro (1990) . The introduction of risk thus reduces the welfare-maximizing (deterministic) share of government expenditure. This is because an increase in exogenous risk raises the variance of the return to capital. In order to maximize welfare, the government must offset that risk by reducing the scale of its activity. As a consequence, there is a negative tradeoff between the optimal deterministic fraction of the government, ˆ h , and an arbitrarily set response to the stochastic shocks, ′ h .
We can also show that the welfare-maximizing stochastic intervention is to set ′ h = 1, and thereby fully insulate the private sector from the production risk. Combining this condition with (18) the corresponding deterministic optimality condition reduces ˆ h = β . Thus the overall optimal expenditure policy is for the government to absorb all the risk and to set its deterministic scale as it would in a riskless economy.
In the absence of risk, (15) and (18) imply ˆ h =˜ h = β , so that the welfare-maximizing and growth-maximizing shares of government expenditure coincide; Barro (1990) . Except if the agent is risk-neutral (γ = 1), risk leads to a divergence between the objectives of growth maximization and welfare maximization; ˆ h <˜ h . The intuition is that the maximization of the growth rate entails more risk than the risk averse agent, concerned with his time profile of consumption, finds to be optimal. If the planner responds optimally to risk, by setting ′ h = 1, and if γ > 0, then for low degrees of risk aversion both growth maximization and welfare maximization reduce to ˆ h =˜ h = β . But in the empirically more relevant case of high risk aversion, γ < 0, the stochastic elements introduce a conflict between these two objectives.
Constrained Expenditure Rule
In the case where the planner follows the constrained expenditure rule, (7'), and responds to aggregate income, dG = hdY, so that ′ h ≡ h , it is straightforward to show that both the expected growth rate and welfare are maximized by adopting the deterministic optimality condition:
In this case, the optimal stabilization policy is for the government partially to absorb the stochastic shocks (ˆ ′ h = β ). Thus an increase in h raises both the mean and the variance of the growth rate in precisely compensating ways, inducing the policy maker to make the same choice under certainty (though being worse off). Moreover, the conflict between expected growth maximization and welfare maximization noted above, ceases to apply.
Equilibrium in the Decentralized Economy
We now turn to the representative agent in the decentralized economy. The individual's stochastic optimization problem is to choose his individual consumption-capital ratio and his rate of capital accumulation to maximize his utility:
subject to his rate of capital accumulation:
where τ, ′ τ denote the tax rates levied on the deterministic and stochastic components of income respectively, and ω is a consumption tax. 18 Through both the degree of congestion and the flow of productive government services, which is tied to the aggregate stock of capital, the individual's rate of capital accumulation depends upon the aggregate rate of capital accumulation described by:
This renders the agent's optimization a two state variable problem, the two states being the agent's private capital stock, k, which is under his direct control, and the aggregate stock of capital, K, the evolution of which follows (19c) and which the individual takes as exogenous. But even though from the agent's standpoint there are two state variables, since all individuals are identical, in the macroeconomic equilibrium the two variables evolve proportionately [K=Nk] , so that the macroeconomic equilibrium can in fact be represented by a single state variable. By assumption, the aggregate and individual proportional shocks are identical and therefore perfectly correlated.
The formal solution to this problem involves substantial technical details that are provided in Section A.1 of the Appendix. In addition to the representative agent, we must consider the government, which we assume maintains a continuously balanced budget. Aggregating tax revenues over the N identical individuals in (19b), and combining with (7), this may be expressed as:
Equating the deterministic and stochastic components of these two equations implies the following restrictions on the deterministic and stochastic tax and expenditure rates:
The deterministic component of government expenditure may be financed by a combination of taxes on income and consumption. But with consumption being nonstochastic, the tax rate on the stochastic component of income must equal the stochastic share of government expenditure.
As the Appendix shows, the decentralized equilibrium, denoted by *, is summarized by:
Equations (11') -(13') differ in two respects from the corresponding expressions, (11) -(13), for the centralized economy. First, expenditure rates are replaced by tax rates, though these are related through the budget balance conditions (21). Second, the net effect of a deterministic tax increase on the consumption-capital ratio now depends upon (γ − βδ ) , rather than γ , while an increase in risk on C K ( ) * and thus the tradeoff between growth and volatility depends upon (γ − 2βδ ).
The source of the difference is that in the decentralized economy, the private marginal physical product of capital is proportional to (1− βδ ) . This is because the specification of relative congestion associated with the public good in (2), increases the agent's incentives to accumulate private capital, since this increases the level of public services he enjoys. The substitution effect in consumption resulting from a tax increase is now (1− βδ ) (1− γ ( ) , so that the total effect is proportional to (γ − βδ ) . A similar argument accounts for the difference in the effects of risk. Both these effects disappear if there is proportional congestion, δ = 0 , when in equilibrium the agent enjoys his individual share of the public good. In that case the decentralized and centralized equilibria coincide.
The effects of various policy and structural changes on the equilibrium growth rate can be derived from (11') -(13'). Rather than pursue this, we shall employ the model to consider the relationship between the size of government and the stability of the economy. Calibrating an RBC model, Greenwood and Huffman (1991) find income taxes to be mildly destabilizing. Gali (1994) finds income taxes to destabilize both output and its growth rate, while government purchases are stabilizing; however, empirically both turn out to be stabilizing. The present model is different from these two models in several critical respects. Greenwood and Huffman focus only on the distortionary effects of taxation [assuming tax revenues to be fully rebated] and abstract entirely from government expenditure, In Gali's analysis government expenditure is nonproductive, while a critical feature of his mechanism is the endogeneity of labor, an aspect that is absent here.
The present analysis offers the following insights. First, since the productivity shock is proportional to the mean of the output flow the percentage variability of the current output level is constant by assumption and thus independent of any government policy instrument. The variability of the growth rate, on the other hand, is responsive to government policy, though its response depends upon the range of policy instruments at the government's disposal. If the government has a consumption tax at its disposal, (13c') implies roughly the opposite conclusions to Gali. Namely that deterministic productive expenditures are destabilizing; the taxation of deterministic income is neutral, while the taxation of the stochastic component of income [equal to stochastic expenditure] is stabilizing. In the absence of a consumption tax a higher deterministic income tax rate [now equal to g] destabilizes the growth rate, as in these previous papers. If further, the government is constrained to a common expenditure/tax rate [g = ′ g = τ = ′ τ ], we are essentially back to the central planner and (13c') implies that a higher tax rate (expenditure share) will destabilize the growth rate if and only if the share of output claimed by the government is below its optimal size.
First-best Optimal Tax Structure
We now determine the nature of the optimal tax structure that will enable the decentralized economy to attain the first-best optimum equilibrium, described by (11) - (13). In doing so, we assume that the deterministic size of government, h, in the two economies are set equal. Equating (13b') to (13b), we see that balancing the stochastic component of the government budget, (21b), ensures that the stochastic shocks to the growth rate in the decentralized economy replicate those in the centrally planned economy. In order for the deterministic component of the growth rate in the decentralized economy to mimic that of the centrally planned economy, (13a') must equal (13a):
a condition that ensures that the first best optimal C K ratio will be replicated as well. Solving (22) for the optimal deterministic income tax, ˆ τ , yields:
Recalling the expression for the optimal deterministic share of government expenditure, given in (18), enables the optimal income tax to be expressed in the following convenient form:
From (24a) we see that for arbitrarily set h and ′ h , the optimal income tax ˆ τ , [which may be a subsidy] depends upon: (i) the deviation in h from its socially optimal share, ˆ h , and (ii) the degree of congestion as measured by 1 − δ . In general, if h is not at its optimum and is subject to congestion, government expenditure generates an externality in the capital market that requires a tax on capital income to correct. Furthermore, provided the degree of congestion is not proportional (δ ≠ 0) , this externality is compounded by risk.
The optimal tax on consumption, ˆ ω , obtained by combining (24a) with (21a), is given by:
Comparing (24a) and (24b) we see that there is a tradeoff between the two forms of taxation, and that this depends crucially upon the degree of congestion. In the case of a pure public good (δ = 1), income should be taxed only to the extent that the deterministic share of government expenditure deviates from its social optimum. In the case of proportional congestion, ( δ = 0 ), expenditure should be fully financed by an income tax. Finally, if both the deterministic and stochastic components of government expenditure are set optimally (ˆ h = β,ˆ ′ h = 1), the overall first-best tax policy is given by:
which is identical to the optimality conditions in the risk-free economy.
The intuition underlying the optimal income tax (24a) is easily understood by comparing the social and private risk-adjusted after-tax returns to capital accumulation in this stochastic economy:
The main difference is that the private marginal physical product of capital is scaled by (1− βδ ) , reflecting the externality from congestion. The optimal tax on capital income must be set so that the private return to investment equals the social return, and the solution for ˆ τ that brings about this equality is given in (23). The risk-free component of the optimal tax rate, given by the first term in these expressions, remains as in the riskless economy, and since this has been discussed previously, need not be considered further here; see Turnovsky (1996) .
The new item involves the variance component. In the case of proportional congestion (δ = 0) , when the public good is equivalent to a private good, the marginal costs due to risk in the decentralized economy are equal to those in the centrally planned economy. They yield no additional externality and no further taxation of private capital is required. But if δ > 0, the gross marginal physical product of capital in the decentralized economy, (1− βδ )Ω , is less than the gross marginal return to capital in the centrally planned economy, Ω . Given the proportionality of the shocks this implies that the risk and the reductions in the returns due to risk are smaller in the decentralized economy. Thus in order to reduce the net private rate of return to the social rate of return, r s , the tax on capital income needs to be increased. Hence an increase in risk raises the optimal tax on capital and reduces the corresponding tax on consumption.
Three further points should be noted. First, if the stochastic components of the return to capital and rents are taxed separately, further flexibility is introduced into the stochastic balanced budget term (21b). Second, if the labor-leisure choice is endogenized, the consumption tax no longer operates as a lump-sum tax. Instead, the consumption tax and the tax on labor income must be jointly set in the light of other distortions in the economy. Third, if the policy maker possesses insufficient tax instruments to replicate the first-best outcome, we can characterize the second-best optimal tax structure This involves eliminating risk and setting the level of deterministic productive government expenditure at its optimum. But the externality created by the public good leads to overconsumption and underaccumulation of capital in the decentralized economy, relative to the first best optimum.
Some Numerical Results
Further insights into the effects of risk can be obtained by performing some numerical analysis of the economy. Tables 1-2 Fiscal parameters:
Being an AK technology, capital should be broadly interpreted as being an amalgam of physical and human capital, with the fraction of human capital (in total capital) being around 1/2. The production parameters thus imply a (physical) capital-output ratio of around 4. We assume that the government good is a pure public good (δ = 1) the production elasticity of which is 0.10. The rate of time preference is 4%. The fraction of output devoted to the government production good is 0.10, with the income tax being 0.10 and the consumption tax being zero. While these parameters are generally plausible, we view them as being largely illustrative.
The focus of our numerical calculations is on tradeoffs involving the standard deviation of the growth rate (σ k ) and the coefficient of relative risk aversion (1 − γ ). We let σ k vary between 0 (no risk) and 0.10. In choosing values for σ k are guided by the evidence reported in Table A1 of Ramey and Ramey, where they provide estimates of the standard deviation of the growth rate for 92 countries.
These data suggest the following. The simple average standard deviation of the growth rate, σ k , for the complete sample of 92 countries is 5.25%, while for the OECD countries it is 2.9%, being 2.2% for Great Britain and 2.6% for the United States. Regionally, the average σ k for Asia is 5.8%, for South America it is 5.3%, while for Africa it is higher, being nearly 7%. Several countries, such as Nicaragua, Iran, and Iraq, that have experienced extreme events, like wars, have standard deviations in excess of 10%. Thus our 5 chosen values for σ k correspond roughly to: (i) σ k = 0, no risk; (ii) σ k = 2.5%, OECD economies; (iii) σ k = 5% , Asia and South America; (iv) σ k = 7.5%, Africa; and (v) σ k = 10% , extreme economies.
Our choice of γ ranges from the logarithmic utility function (γ = 0 ) to a coefficient of relative risk aversion of over 10. These values are a condensation of those found in the literature, which range from the logarithmic to values of γ = −17 (Obstfeld 1994 ) and beyond. We feel most comfortable with values in the range γ = −2 to γ = −5 as being most plausible. Table 1 summarizes various aspects of the equilibrium associated with different values of σ k and γ , with other parameters being as fixed above. Part A describes the expected growth-risk tradeoff and corresponds to the tradeoff described by equation (13a') above,
The fact that it is positive is consistent with the risk-return tradeoff in aggregate technology originally argued by Black (1987) and supported by empirical evidence of Kormendi and Meguire (1985) . From Table 1 it is seen that the slope of the tradeoff steepens sharply with the degree of risk and the degree of risk aversion. Our estimates suggest a slope of the tradeoff at around 0.3 (for γ = −5) at the mean (σ k = 5.25%) which is a little less than the empirical estimate of 0.5.
Parts B and C summarize the equilibrium consumption to income ratio and the mean equilibrium growth rate. For the plausible combination of parameters characterizing OECD economies (e.g. σ k = 0.025, γ = −2) this implies a consumption-income ratio, C Y , of around 0.75, together with an equilibrium (per capita) growth rate, ψ , of about 1.65%. Looking across the columns we see that as the degree of risk increases, C Y falls while ψ increases. The responses are quite gradual for low degrees of risk aversion, but become more dramatic as the degree of risk aversion increases. Table 1 .C has interesting implications for the tradeoff between risk and growth. For example, if OECD economies were to eliminate risk entirely, this would be associated with a 0.10 percentage point reduction in the mean growth rate. While this appears to be a gentle tradeoff, we should bear in mind that growth is a long term process and a 0.10% reduction in the growth rate will compound to a 10% reduction in the mean level of the capital stock, over 100 years. The tradeoff is much steeper as the degree of risk increases. In the case of Asian economies, that average around σ k = 0.05 , also approximately the mean of the Ramey-Ramey sample, we see that elimination of risk could be associated with more than a 0.5 percentage point reduction in the mean growth rate.
While risk is associated with a higher growth rate, the benefits are more than outweighed by the associated increase in instability. Table 1 .D indicates that the welfare losses due to risk expressed in terms of this equivalent variation measure for the OECD economies are of the order of 2%. That is, these economies would need to be compensated by an increase in their initial capital stock of around 2% in order to offset the adverse effects of risk. These costs may be viewed as being modest, but they are not trivial either. The mean of the Ramey-Ramey sample (the Asian economies) suffer around 5-8% loss in welfare due to risk. African economies suffer welfare losses equivalent to a 12-20% reduction in the capital stock, while the "extreme economies" incur welfare losses of around 20-35% of their capital stock, due to risk. Thus there is little doubt that risk has significant welfare consequences for many economies. Table 2 summarizes various aspects of government policy. Part A derives the optimal deterministic component, ˆ h , and shows how this varies with the coefficient of risk aversion and the degree of risk. In the absence of risk, ˆ h = β = 0.10, which is also the global optimum when the degree of stochastic intervention is optimized as well; (ˆ ′ h = 1). As risk increases, the optimal deterministic size of the government declines, doing so gradually for moderate degrees of risk and risk aversion. For the low-risk economies, the optimal size of government should be reduced by about 2-3% to 0.097-0.098. For the average economy in the Ramey and Ramey sample, the size of the government should be reduced by 10% from 0.10 to around 0.09. For economies experiencing more severe risk, the reductions in the optimal (deterministic) size of government are more dramatic. Table 2 .B summarizes the growth-maximizing size of the government. In the absence of risk
this is ˜ h = β = 0.10 and coincides with the welfare-maximizing size, as in Barro (1990) . But in the presence of risk, the two optima diverge, doing so quite markedly. For the OECD economies, the growth-maximizing size of the government is increased from around 0.10 to 0.11. For the average economy in the Ramey-Ramey sample (σ k = 0.05 ) the welfare-maximizing size of government is reduced to 0.086, whereas the growth-maximizing size is now nearly doubled to 0.165 (for γ = −5). Table 2 .C summarizes the optimal tax rates under the assumption that h = 0.15, β = 0.10, δ = 1. The interesting aspect of these results is that increasing risk raises the tax rate on both income and consumption, even though the level of government expenditure remains the same.
Even though τ increases with risk, increasing the amount of revenue raised by the income tax, the consumption-capital ratio falls, doing so sufficiently to reduce the tax base for the consumption tax and thus raising the required rate to ensure that total revenues sufficient to finance h are obtained.
Conclusions
The role of public expenditure in enhancing growth is an important policy issue. Analytical treatments have almost without exception been based on deterministic models, thus abstracting from key issues pertaining to risk. In this paper we have analyzed a model of productive government expenditure in the context of a stochastic AK growth model. We have assumed that government expenditure comprises a deterministic and a stochastic component, and that the former enhances the productivity of the economy. The results we have obtained fall into the following categories.
First, we have characterized the stochastic equilibrium for a centrally planned economy, which is essentially a stochastic analog to the well known Barro (1990) model. Our results emphasize the tradeoff between the effects of both deterministic and stochastic government expenditures on the equilibrium growth rate and its variance. Both the growth-maximizing and the welfare-maximizing shares of government expenditure have been derived, and shown to depend (differentially) upon the degree of risk in the economy. Whereas production risk reduces the welfare-maximizing share of government expenditure, it may either increase or decrease the growth-maximizing share, depending upon the degree of risk aversion of the representative agent. Thus the coincidence of the two objectives in the deterministic economy does not extend to a stochastic version of his model.
Maximizing the (expected) growth rate imposes too much risk on a risk averse agent. In addition, while welfare maximization requires the government to absorb all the risk, this is inconsistent with growth maximization if the degree of risk aversion exceeds unity as empirical evidence suggests.
Second, we have characterized the stochastic equilibrium in a decentralized economy, a critical aspect of which is the degree of (relative) congestion. We have derived the first-best optimal tax structure and shown how it shares the general characteristics of the optimal tax structure in a deterministic economy. Specifically, the optimal income tax is necessary to correct for distortions arising from: (i) the deviation of government expenditure from the social optimum, and (ii) the degree of congestion. Risk influences the optimal tax rate only as long as the degree of congestion is not proportional (δ ≠ 0 ), when the public good is essentially like a private good. Otherwise, risk imposes an additional externality that requires a higher tax on capital to correct.
Finally, the formal analysis has been supplemented by a set of numerical simulations, assessing the quantitative significance of risk. Most OECD economies are subject to only mild degrees of production risk, and for these economies the effects are modest, though not negligible. The average economy in the world has a standard deviation of its growth rate of over 5%. For this representative economy the effects of risk are substantial, leading to welfare losses of 5-8% and to substantial divergence between the welfare-maximizing and the growth-maximizing size of the government.
The model has focused on a closed economy and several important extensions suggest themselves. Rodrik (1996) has suggested that a small open economy exposed to international risk will tend to have a larger government sector, with an important role for the government being to absorb some fraction of the foreign risk and stabilize domestic income. An extension of this model to an open economy will enable us to conduct a rigorous theoretical analysis of these issues. Second, relaxation of the assumption of a balanced budget will permit the government to undertake the intertemporal smoothing of stochastic shocks. Third, the introduction of productive government expenditure as a capital good is desirable, although the analytical complexity will increase significantly.
The differential generator of the value function V(k, K,t) is
where we are assuming that with all agents being identical, the aggregate and individual proportional shocks are identical and perfectly correlated.
The individual's formal optimization problem is to choose c and his individual rate of capital accumulation to maximize the Lagrangian expression
In doing this he takes the evolution of the aggregate variables and with them the volume of public service he receives as given. Taking the partial derivative with respect to c and canceling e −ρt yields
In addition, the value function must satisfy the Bellman equation
Being a function of two state variables, k and K, the Bellman equation is a partial differential equation.
In this case the solution can be obtained as follows.
Take the partial derivative with respect to k of the Bellman equation (A.5) . Noting the definition of (A.14), this yields the following condition:
Taking the stochastic differential of this quantity yields:
Substituting (A.4) and (A.7) into (A.6) leads to:
Ω(h,δ )σ u 2 X Kk = 0 (A.8)
Now impose the macroeconomic equilibrium conditions, H = hZ = hΩK, K = Nk , enabling (A.8) to be expressed as: Taking the stochastic differential of this relationship and taking expected values yields:
Focusing on an equilibrium in which C K is constant, we may write:
Recalling (A.1c), we have:
Combining (A.11), (A.13), (A.14) and (A.1c), the stochastic macroeconomic equilibrium growth path is of the form: Equations (A.15) and (A.17) correspond to (13a') and (11') of the text.
A.2 Welfare Loss Expressed as Equivalent Variation in Capital Stock
In general, starting from an initial capital stock, K 0 , the level of welfare in the centrally planned economy is given by X(K 0 ) = φK 0 γ where φ = 1 γN Table 1 A. Expected Growth-Risk Tradeoff 
C. Equilibrium Mean Growth Rate (in percent)
σ k = 0 σ k = 2.5% σ k = 5% σ k = 7.5% σ k = 10% Table 2 A. Welfare Maximizing Size of Government 
B. Growth Maximizing Size of Government
σ k = 0 σ k = 2.5% σ k = 5% σ k = 7.5% σ k = 10%
